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Abstract—This paper aims to propose a new form of financial 
market regulation based on the visibility of the risk rate of 
financial products. The applicability of this framework is 
studied by exploiting a Mean Field Analysis model that allows 
to intuitively describe systems characterized by a large number 
of interacting objects. A qualitative result is illustrated in order 
to show how the visibility of the asset risk limits the liquidity 
problematic in presence of financial crisis.  
Keywords-component; toxic asset, liquidity crisis, visibility, 
Main Field Analysis   
I.   
The current financial crisis has shown the fragility of the 
regulation authorities or rather of the three levels of 
European committee (Cebs, Cesr and Ceiops). The 
regulation problematic were found especially in the 
managing of both Large complex financial institutions (Lcfi) 
and toxic financial assets.  
The explanations of these problematic are to find in the 
lack of information about the actors and products that 
interact in the market. While the actors regulation has been 
widely discussed (e.g. see [7]), the asset regulation has been 
neglected due to the complex classification of the financial 
products. This complexity depends on the different risk types 
lying inside the asset: the legal risk linked to the legal 
characteristics of   products; the volatility risk linked to the 
product performances and the liquidity risk linked to the 
likelihood to sell the products.  
It would be useful to create an authority organization that 
will declare the risk rate of the products in order to both test 
products functionality before their distribution, and to 
provide a kind of product licence, exactly like happens in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Moreover the authority will follow 
the products in all market life declaring  their possible state 
switch in toxic asset caused for example by the actors who 
acquire them or by the quantity gained.  
Getting inspiration from these scheme, the authors 
present a new regulation framework focused on both the 
financial assets and on their visibility for restraining the 
financial liquidity crisis. The framework is based on the idea 
that if the risk inside the asset is visible then it is possible to 
boundary the impact of the toxic products instead of limit the 
liquidity throughout the financial market. The study of the 
asset regulation is done developing a model through the 
Mean Field Analysis approach [5]. This approach permits to 
intuitively describe a systems characterized by a large 
number of interacting objects, such as financial products. 
Thanks to its multilevel structure it allows to easily create 
different scenario in which analyze the model. After an 
overview on the  financial assets (Section II), the paper will 
describe the modelling approach (Sections III and IV). A 
qualitative result (Section V) shows that in visibility 
condition the financial liquidity crisis is narrow only on toxic 
product and not on the entire financial system. 
II. THE OVERVIEW ON THE FINANCIAL ASSET  
Normally the financial product suffers from different risk 
types: the legal risk, volatility risk and the liquidity risk. A 
common financial product can become a toxic product under 
a set of conditions depending on the market situation (for 
example in crisis period) or on the actor that buys it or on the 
quantity bought. A toxic asset is any asset that has a current 
market value significantly below its book value. Further, the 
market for a toxic asset is very illiquid. It is virtually 
impossible to sell a toxic asset at a reasonable price, if at all. 
Toxic asset was a term frequently used during the banking 
crisis of 2007-2009 [1][2][3][4]. 
A mortgage-backed security became a toxic asset as a 
result of the following process. First, with the sharp decrease 
in house prices underlying the mortgage-backed security, its 
value dropped dramatically. Second, the holder of this 
mortgage-backed security couldn't find a buyer. Indeed, 
unless house prices went back to inflated high prices 
underlying most of those mortgage-backed securities, the 
purchaser of this toxic asset was guaranteed to lose money. 
Sharp decrease in value and illiquid trading markets are two 
key features of a toxic asset.  
When a financial product becomes a toxic asset lead a set of 
problems:  
• according to market observers, these toxic assets could 
not be easily valued and were therefore illiquid; 
• banks with many such assets could not sell them easily to 
raise funds necessary for lending; 
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• the authorities like the Treasury and the Fed have to 
respond with a combination of policy actions including 
asset purchases, loan guarantees, and equity injections.  
The presence of an authority able to follow the financial 
products from the creation can limit the liquidity problem. 
The product - with the detail of its risks (especially 
liquidity one) - will be tagged by the authority during its life 
on the market in order to keep updated its risk status. This 
type of control will permit to circumscribe the crisis 
identifying the toxic product and consequently not extending 
the liquidity problematic to all the financial market.  
The following section shows the Mean Field Analysis 
formalism and the Section IV illustrates the process used to 
model the proposed asset regulation through this 
methodology.  
III. MEAN FIELD ANALYSIS APPROACH  
The Mean Field Model is a representation that describes 
the behavior of a system as a collection of a large number of 
interacting objects. Objects are divided into classes: all the 
objects belonging to a given class have exactly the same 
behavior characterized by exactly the same parameters. If 
two objects perform the same actions at different rates, they 
must belong to different classes. Objects might be influenced 
by the distribution of the other objects in the system. Each 
object is modeled by a Continuous Time Markov Chain 
(CTMC), whose transition rates may depend on the state of 
the whole system. A CTCM is a mathematical description of 
a simple Stochastic process, characterized by a state, whose 
dynamic behavior depends only on its current state. In order 
to ease the description of complex systems, classes are 
further grouped into meta-classes. All the classes that derive 
from the same meta-class are characterized by the same 
structure, but different rates. The number of objects in every 
class changes dynamically: new objects might be formed at a 
given rate (expressed as quantity of new objects created per 
unit of time), and each object has an exponentially 
distributed maximum lifetime. More formally, we call the 
Mean Field Model M, a tuple: 
  M ൌ ሺMC, OCሻ    (1) 
where MC ൌ ሼmcሺଵሻ , . . . , mcሺ୩ሻሽ   is a set of k meta-
classes and OC ൌ ሼocሾଵሿ , . . . , ocሾ୫ሿሽ   is a set of m object 
classes. Each meta-class mcሺ୧ሻ mc is in turn defined by a 
tuple: 
mcሺ୧ሻ ൌ ሺcሺ୧ሻ, nሺ୧ሻ, Lሺ୧ሻ,Λሺ୧ሻ, Cሺ୧ሻ, bሺ୧ሻ, Dሺ୧ሻሻ  (2) 
Where cሺ୧ሻ is a label corresponding to the name of the 
meta-class, nሺ୧ሻis the number of states of the CTMC, Lሺ୧ሻ ൌ
ሼ lሺ୧ሻሽ is a set of labels (the names of the states) and Λሺ୧ሻ ൌ
ሼλଵሺ୧ሻ , . . . , λ୮౟ሺ୩ሻ  ሽ  is a set of formal parameters. Cሺ୧ሻ ൌ หc୳୪ሺ୧ሻห is 
the n(i) × n(i) infinitesimal generator of the CTMC where 
c୳୪ሺ୧ሻ is the transition rate from state u to state l. bሺ୧ሻ ൌ หb୪ሺ୧ሻห is 
the size n(i) birth vector: its element b୪ሺ୧ሻ represents the rate 
at which new objects are created in state l.  Dሺ୧ሻ  ൌ
 diagሺd୪୪ሺ୧ሻሻ  is a n(i) × n(i) diagonal matrix, such that 1/
d୪୪ሺ୧ሻrepresents the mean exponential lifetime of an object in 
state l. The entries of Cሺ୧ሻ, bሺ୧ሻ and Dሺ୧ሻ may depend on the 
actual values assigned to the parameters Λ . An object class 
ocሾ୨ሿ is also a tuple: 
 ocሺ୨ሻ ൌ ሺoሺ୨ሻ, cሺ୨ሻ,Γሺ୨ሻ, Nሺ୨ሻ, π଴ሺ୨ሻሻ   (3) 
Where ocሺ୨ሻ is a label representing the name of the 
class;  cሺ୨ሻ is name of the meta-class from which the class 
derives; Γሺ୨ሻ ൌ  ሼγଵሾ୨ሿ , . . . , γ୮౟ሾ୨ሿሽ is the set of actual parameters 
assigned to each of the formal parameters of the meta-class 
defined by Λሺ୧ሻ; Nሾ୨ሿ is the initial number of objects;  π଴ሾ୨ሿ is a 
probability vector of size nሾ୨ሿ  that defines the initial state 
probability for the objects belonging to this class. We define 
nሾ୨ሿ as the number of states of class j inherited from its meta-
class, that is nሾ୨ሿ ൌ  nሺ୫ୣ୲ୟିୡ୪ୟୱୱ ୭୤ ୨ሻ. Note that we use round 
brackets in superscripts for elements corresponding to meta-
classes and square brackets to denote elements belonging to 
classes. The value of each actual parameters can depend on 
the distribution of the number of objects among the states of 
all the classes that compose the model.  
While the state space growths exponentially in 
conventional compositional approaches, our mean field 
based methodology provides approximations of the system 
that scales linearly with respect to the number of objects. 
Thanks to the previous assumptions, the solution of the 
model can be approximated using the Mean-Field analysis 
technique [6], following the results proposed in [5]. In 
particular the counts of the number of objects in each state 
are approximated by continuous variables, that are expressed 
by means of a set of ordinary differential equations. The 
solution of such equations, which is obtained using a suitable 
numerical algorithm, describes the evolution of the model. 
IV.  THE MODEL  
In this section we first describe the financial market 
framework we considered, then we provide the process 
adopted to develop the corresponding mean-field analysis 
based model. 
A. Description 
The model has been creating considering the sequent 
milestones: 
TABLE I.  THE MODEL CLASSIFICATION. 
CLASS META-CLASS
Crisis Level Financial Scenario 
Visibility Regulation 
Product A Product 
Product B Product 
Product C Product 
 
1. the product. We define three products: A is a product 
that under established conditions can become toxic; 
B and C are products with different behaviour.  
2. the actors. The products can be exchanged between 
two entities: from the institutions, that have an 
intermediary role, to the investors. 
3. the authority. We suppose to have a new entity that 
monitors the risk level of financial products.  
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In the model are considered three different financial 
scenarios: level 1 defines a normal economic/financial 
situation without any crisis; level 2 accounts for an incoming 
crisis;  level 3 represents a stronger crisis than the one in 
level 2. The products are sold with different rates according  
to the financial scenario, i.e. higher the crisis level and lower 
the exchange rate. Under these assumptions there is a 
liquidity crisis that invests all the financial market and 
consequently all the  assets.  
By introducing the supervision of an authority that 
monitors the risk of the products, the effects on the market 
are different. Nevertheless the crisis reduces the capacity of 
investment for all the products, the regulator activity 
performed by the authority allows to limit the exchange rate 
of the asset became toxic. Otherwise the no toxic assets are 
not affected by the liquidity crisis, and they are still 
exchanged even with a lower rate.   
The mean field methodology used for outline this 
framework regulation can be summarized in three steps. First, 
we identify the different types of entities that compose the 
system and we abstract their behaviour into meta-classes. 
Second, we define the Markov chains and the formal 
parameters of the meta-classes. Finally, we define a class for 
each type of entity. Each class is derived from a meta-class 
by assigning appropriate rates to the formal parameters.  
The solution computed by the Mean Field Analysis 
Model provides the time evolution of the number of objects 
for each class. The goal of this work is to observe the 
number of asset units exchanged in different scenarios and in 
presence/absence of the regulation policy, hence the attention 
is focused on the number of objects representing the products 
purchased by investors. 
B. First-Step: classes and meta-classes identification 
Since the classes represent the actors of our model, we 
first identify the entities that characterize this phenomenon, 
and we look for similarities to abstract their behaviour and to 
define an appropriate number of meta-classes. We decide to 
define our model through five actors grouped in three meta-
classes (see table 1).  
The metaclass  Financial Scenario has just one class that 
is Level used to define the crisis status of the market. We 
decide to consider three different crisis levels: 
• Level 1: defines a normal financial situation; 
• Level 2: defines a low level of financial crisis;  
• Level 3: defines a high level of financial crisis; 
The metaclass Regulation has one class that is Visibility used 
to denote the presence/absence of the visibility of the toxic 
assets. 
 
Figure 1.  The Markov chains of Regulation, Product and Financial 
Scenario meta-classes. 
The metaclass Product has three classes that are Product 
A, Product B and Product C used to define different products 
with respect to their risk degree. Product A is characterized 
by a high degree of risk  whereas Product B and Product C 
have lower degree. Each of these classes class is 
characterized by a high number of objects that represent the 
asset units inside the market. 
C. Second –Step: meta-class specification 
Now we define the Markov chains  (depicted in Figure 1) 
corresponding to the meta-classes identified before. 
Financial Scenario can be in three states each one 
representing the three different market status described 
before. The transition among the states depends on the rates 
λ set in an arbitrary way. Note that each state can be reached 
by the others, for instance the transition from level 2 to level 
3 happens with rate λ2to3. 
The Visibility can be in two states, Presence or Absence, 
that describe the regulation policy performed by the market 
authority. The transitions among the two states depend on the 
rates λ set in an arbitrary way. 
The Product has two states, Institutions and Investors, 
that describe whether the products are in the institution or in 
the investor portfolio. The exchange rate from institutions to 
investors is defined by λ exchange. 
All the meta-classes presented above can be formally 
expressed using the tuple reported in (2). 
D. 4.4 Third-Step: classes and parameters specification 
The crucial phase of this work is the computation of the 
rates that determine the relations and the interactions among 
all class objects of the model. The formal rates (depicted in 
Figure 1) must be instantiated for each class. As mentioned 
above the parameters of classes derived from meta-classes 
Financial Market and  Regulation are set in an arbitrary way, 
i.e. we defined the time instants of their state switch. 
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if (Visibility is absent) 
then Products units move from the Institutions to the 
Investors with rate: 
 
λ exchange = Rf * IC(Crisis Level) * G 
 
 else Products units move from the Institutions to the 
Investors with rate: 
 
λ exchange = Rf * IC(Crisis Level) * G * R 
 
Figure 2.  The funcion used to define λ exchange. 
In the following we focus on the formalization of the 
meta-class Product and on the definition of its rate λ exchange. 
In Figure 2 is depicted the pseudo-code used to compute it. 
 When there is not visibility the exchange rate depends on 
the : 
• Risk factor degree (Rf) of the assets; 
• Investment Capacity (IC) as function of the crisis level. 
The Investment Capacity factor decreases as the crisis 
level increases and is uniformly distributed among all 
the products;  
• Growth factor (G) that increases the exchange rate 
when the sold product units exceed a defined threshold 
(Tg). 
When the visibility is present the exchange rate of 
products is modulated by the factor R ( Regulator factor). In 
particular, if the risk degree is under a given threshold then R 
is set to 1 and it does not affect the exchange rate. Otherwise, 
R is set to a value less than 1 in order to reduce the exchange 
rate of the toxic asset. The value assigned to R depends on 
the crisis level as reported in  table 2. 
When there is visibility, the impact of the crisis on 
investment capacity factor (IC) is reduced. Additionally, 
when the market is in the crisis level 3, most of the 
investment  capacity (80%) is uniformly distributed between 
the products  with low risk (Product B and Product C) and 
only the remaining part (20%) is absorbed by the product 
with high risk (Product A) 
TABLE II.  REGULATOR AND INVESTMENT CAPACITY FACTORS  
Level R for toxic 
assets 
IC for toxic 
assets 
IC for no 
toxic assets
1 1 1 1 
2 0.3 1/3 2/3 
3 0.1 1/5 4/5 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
In this section we present a qualitative result to explain 
the applicability of Mean-Field Analysis Model. The 
potentiality of this methodology can be resumed in three 
relevant features: flexible modeling approach, capacity of 
solving complex system, managing financial issues.   
The flexibility is obtained thanks to the multilevel model 
structure (split into meta-class, functions, parameter and 
model) that supports the execution of experiments for 
different economic systems. For instance, the meta-classes 
set proposed in this work permits to describe other diffusion 
phenomena (e.g. product, process or organization model 
diffusion).  
The flexibility of the approach can also be seen from the 
function and parameter levels. In fact, once the classes of the 
model have been selected, the use of different sets of 
functions and/or parameters allows to investigate various 
dynamics of interactions among actors. Indeed in this work 
we mainly focus on the regulation visibility impact  on 
exchange rate of asset from bank to investor, but a further 
model refinement can be also focused on other important 
issues such as other type of regulations on products or 
authority.  
The graphs reported in Figure 3 show the diffusion of 
three products in different scenarios characterized by 
different level of crisis and by presence or absence of 
visibility. The Tg threshold was fixed to 20.000, indeed, the 
plots point out that products increase their exchange rate 
when this value is exceeded. 
In financial situation without visibility the product 
exchanges (see continuous red curves in Figure 3) are 
strongly affected by the crisis level: 
• Level 1: there is not crisis and the products A, B 
and C are exchanged into the market with different 
rates that depend on their risk factor (Rf); 
• Level 2: the crisis is starting and exchange rates of 
the products A, B and C tend to diminish according 
to the investment  capacity reduction; 
• Level 3: the crisis level is increased and exchange 
rates of the products A, B and C are reduced 
drastically due to the investment capacity reduction. 
The third scenario (Level 3) draws attention on the 
liquidity crisis that invests not only the toxic product but also 
the products with a low effective risk that is perceived as 
high due to the impact of financial crisis. As outlined in the 
graphs all the three products reduce almost to zero their 
exchange when entering into the level 3. 
The application of the regulator policy modifies the 
qualitative results in the levels 2 and 3. The plots reported in 
Figure 3 point out the effect of the regulation (dashed curves) 
applied at different time instants: after 2, 4, and 6 time units.  
When the market enters the crisis (level 2) -as well as the 
investment capacity decreases for all the system- the actors 
continue to exchange the products A, B and C with different 
rate depending on their risk. The exchange rate remains 
higher than without visibility also in the scenario of high 
crisis (level 3) in which the exchange of the products B and 
C continues, whereas the exchange of the product A is 
strongly limited (but not stopped).  
Thanks to the Mean Field Analysis model is possible to 
explain that the visibility on financial products avoid the 
liquidity crisis due to the informative asymmetry typical of 
the financial market. If the market is able to limit liquidity 
crisis then it could also limit the crisis consequences on 
372
macro level (think about the U.S.A. liquidity injection). The 
regulation control could be done by the authority creating a 
risk licence that takes the asset during all its market life. 
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Figure 3.  The time evolution of the number of exchanged asset units for each product.
 
373
